Probabilistic theories have been claimed to constitute a new paradigm for the psychology of reasoning. A key assumption of these theories is captured by what they call the Equation, the hypothesis that the meaning of the conditional is probabilistic in nature and that the probability of If p then q is the conditional probability, in such a way that P(if p then q) = P(q|p). Using the probabilistic truth-table task in which participants are required to evaluate the probability of If p then q sentences, the present study explored the pervasiveness of the Equation through ages (from early adolescence to adulthood), types of conditionals (basic, causal, and inducements) and contents. The results reveal that the Equation is a late developmental achievement only endorsed by a narrow majority of educated adults for certain types of conditionals depending on the content they involve. Agerelated changes in evaluating the probability of all the conditionals studied closely mirror the development of truth-value judgements observed in previous studies with traditional truth-table tasks. We argue that our modified mental model theory can account for this development, and hence for the findings related with the probability task, which do not consequently support the probabilistic approach of human reasoning over alternative theories.
Introduction
The capacity to reason is of paramount importance for members of the Homo sapiens species and, not surprisingly, understanding how human beings reason and how this capacity develops with age have been among the main aims of psychology. This enquiry has for a long time been connected with the questions of rationality and logic. Accordingly, Piaget described intellectual development as a progress toward rationality through the construction of mental operations structured in a logical way (Inhelder & Piaget, 1958; Piaget & Inhelder, 1959) . More recently, prominent theories suggested the existence in human mind of logical rules constituting a form of mental logic (Braine & O'Brien, 1998; Rips, 1994) . Alternative accounts were proposed that denied the existence of such rules, assuming that people reason by constructing and manipulating mental models of the state of affairs the available premises refer to (Johnson-Laird & Byrne, 1991) . Despite their divergences, these approaches shared common conceptions about both the reasoning processes that deserve investigation, and the normative theory to which human reasoning should be compared. Theories rooted in this tradition focused on the processes of deduction and truth preservation based on binary distinctions between truth and falsity or validity and invalidity. How logical thinking is possible in humans and how far people conform to logical standards were questions of main interest, with the key discovery that human reasoning is prone to biases and often relies on heuristics instead of analytic thinking (Evans, 1982; Kahneman, 2003 Kahneman, , 2011 Kahneman & Tversky, 1972 , 1973 
